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The last few years of our political history have witnessed the emergence of a national 
preparedness architecture boasting numerous plans, strategies, directives, legislation, 
and even more novel programs to address those issues identified therein. One of the 
more recent entrants to this collection includes Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive-21 (HSPD-21) also known as the Public Health and Medical Preparedness 
Strategy. On October 18, 2007 HSPD-21 was released to the public calling for a 
transformation in the national approach to public health and medical preparedness in 
the United States.   
Like most everything else in this body of work, HSPD-21 adheres to the paradigm of 
the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the National Response 
Framework (NRF), and elaborates on a preparedness vision conceptualized in previous 
strategies. The latest deliberations, as prioritized by this strategy, are to bolster the 
nation’s ability to manage a public health crisis by stimulating improvements in the 
areas of biosurveillance, countermeasure distribution, mass casualty care, and 
community resilience; the objective being to create a much more tightly integrated 
systems-approach toward public health and medical preparedness.  Interestingly, a huge 
potential component of this proposed system is already relatively well developed and 
continues to grow, but has been unable to garner significant preparedness support in 
the government’s frenzy to develop wholly new entities and to indoctrinate skeptical 
hospitals.  
As providers of critical medical and human services to vulnerable populations in 
medically underserved areas, community health centers (CHCs) – the untapped 
resource – are often recognized as indispensable and respected authority figures within 
their communities. As federally qualified health centers (FQHCs), regulated by the 
Bureau of Primary Health Care (BPHC) in the Health Resources and Services 
Administration (HRSA) of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), 
the administrative infrastructure and accountability mechanisms are already in place to 
groom CHCs for an active and measurable role in public health and medical 
preparedness.  
This article discusses the background of the Health Center Program and the potential 
roles of CHCs in relation to the Public Health and Medical Preparedness Strategy. 
Specifically, it argues that CHCs by philosophic orientation, geographic location, and as 
publicly funded entities,1 are well-positioned to provide medical services, education, and 
other human services to prevent, prepare for, mitigate, respond to, and recover from the 
public health impact of a bioterrorist event or other biological disease outbreak. 
Ultimately, this paper contends that aggressive investment in CHCs and their 
emergency management programs is a dual-purpose investment that will (1) support 
many of the objectives identified in the Public Health and Medical Preparedness 
Strategy, and (2) create greater social equity by reducing health disparities and make 
public health emergency management more accessible to special needs populations. 
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Finally, it discusses the current state of preparedness in CHCs, identifies barriers to 
implementation, and presents essential recommendations to get our nation on the path 
to public health and medical preparedness.   
THE HEALTH CENTER PROGRAM 
A community health center (CHC) is a non-profit primary-care practice governed with 
federal support via Section 330 of the Public Health Services Act2 and is strategically 
located in a federally-designated medically-underserved area to provide high-quality 
primary and preventive health care to anyone seeking care, regardless of their ability to 
pay. The emphasis on the underserved includes the uninsured, underinsured, Medicaid 
and Medicare recipients, and those without a medical home or who otherwise lack 
access due to travel distance, hours of operation, and cultural and linguistic barriers. 
The majority of patients served would fall in the classification of indigent care including 
migrant health and healthcare for the homeless, but CHCs also provide primary care in 
rural areas where services simply do not exist. Beyond the many required services that 
health center programs must provide and/or coordinate, most CHCs (dependent on 
their resources, capabilities, and the needs of their target population) directly provide 
pharmaceutical services, translation services, substance abuse and mental health 
services, and oral health services.3 
According to the National Association of Community Health Centers (NACHC), there 
are around 1,200 community health centers with more than 6,600 delivery sites (see 
Figure 1) spread across all fifty states and U.S. territories providing primary care to 
more than 18 million patients annually.4 Fortunately, the Bush Administration has been 
fairly supportive of the Health Center Program in recent years through the President’s 
Health Center Initiative. Between 2002 and 2007, the goal of CHC expansion into 1,200 
additional communities was reached by doubling annual investments from $1 billion in 
2000 to nearly $2 billion today.5 Even with these successes, the numbers of the 
medically underserved in our nation is staggering. The number of uninsured Americans 
is projected to reach 60 million by 2010 and another 56 million Americans lack access to 
primary care simply due to a shortage of physicians in their communities.6 
STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION: THE ROLE OF THE COMMUNITY 
HEALTH CENTERS  
HSPD-21 or the Public Health and Medical Preparedness Strategy asserts that the most 
critical components of public health and medical preparedness include biosurveillance, 
countermeasure distribution, mass casualty care, and community resilience. Within 
each of these defined critical areas, CHCs have the potential to make significant 
contributions to our nation’s emergency preparedness and response efforts. 
This section discusses the variety of ways in which CHCs can support their emergency 
management networks including: biosurveillance in hard-to-reach populations, 
supporting local health departments by providing staff and/or facilities for dispensing 
countermeasures, supporting mass casualty care efforts by mitigating surge on area 
hospitals and health systems, and promoting community resilience by supporting the 
spectrum of emergency management activities. 
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Overwhelming evidence exists suggesting that vulnerable populations suffer the greatest 
during natural disasters and epidemics. According to the U.S. Commission on Civil 
Rights: 
A crisis exists that has left a vast number of Americans, primarily the poor, 
women, and language, racial, and ethnic minorities, unprotected and uncared for 
by our nation’s medical system. The current and very real threat of a biological 







Data Source: Health Resources and Services Administration, 2005 
 
Patterns in susceptibility to illness and disease are unevenly stratified across 
socioeconomic status, racial, and/or ethnic groups. For example, Philip Blumenshine 
and others suggest that pandemic influenza will permeate these vulnerable populations 
with greater ease and speed because of financial and social constraints like limited 
telecommuting opportunities, financial pressures to go to work, and reliance on daycare 
services for childcare.9 Ultimately these pressures create a tendency to congregate which 
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is clearly dangerous for disease containment and will result in greater affliction for these 
groups. 
Consistent with the overarching objective of CHCs to provide primary and preventive 
care to underserved populations, service delivery sites are logically nestled within these 
vulnerable populations and could be strategically utilized to enhance our nation’s 
biosurveillance capabilities in the very populations that may be the first to signal a 
public health problem. Most CHCs occupy freestanding, permanent facilities while 
others are based in public schools, in or near hospitals and tribal communities, and still 
others operate seasonal programs and mobile clinics bringing their services directly to 
the patient. CHC services and the expertise of their clinical staff, however, often extend 
even beyond the immediate facility. Many CHCs partner with or are contracted by 
nursing homes, correctional facilities, and various shelters to provide services, as well. 
With this reach in their respective communities, CHCs could be leveraged as the eyes 
and ears of the public health community in these hard to reach populations.  
The BPHC issued Program Assistance Letter (PAL) 2002-02 advising health centers 
to “utilize the CDC and other appropriate clinical information resources on bioterrorism 
to enhance the health center’s ability to recognize the signs and symptoms of diseases 
and toxic agents that may be used in a bioterrorist attack.”10 Yet for agencies that are 
dedicated to expanding patient services, at times operating very close to the margin, this 
undertaking is generally not managed in any methodical way. In 2006, Art Clawson and 
others surveyed Florida-based CHCs and revealed that of those respondents having an 
emergency operations plan, only 41 percent had written policies that addressed 
bioterrorism preparedness and only 56 percent discussed reporting suspicious 
symptoms to the county health department.11 Moreover, when prompted with the 
question of what the center would need to respond, 80 percent of respondents reported 
a high-priority need for training personnel.12 
C. Robert Kline, Jr. describes the ruinous impact of a biological attack and highlights 
the urgency of preparation when he states:   
The stresses placed on responding to disasters, of whatever source but especially 
bioweapon release, strain even the best systems, and they do so for a long time 
with both volatile perturbations and a rapidity that is often hard to grasp. 
Preplanning reduces some of the stresses. Prevention is cheaper than cure.13 
It has already been established that the public health infrastructure is overtaxed.14 
Michael A. Stoto and others warn that even the threat of a localized outbreak will 
compel a surge in surveillance in surrounding jurisdictions.15 A surge, coupled with a 
slower turnaround in investigation and diagnosis for uncommon pathogens, could be an 
invitation for a costly recovery as opposed to the presumably cheaper alternatives of 
prevention and mitigation. Preparing CHCs to support biosurveillance activities and 
surveillance systems could be an inexpensive and effective means for bolstering the 
public health infrastructure during an otherwise crippling incident. All that is required 
to implement this valuable asset is training practitioners to recognize the clinical 
features of the various biological weapons agents and providing adequate and robust 
reporting channels to facilitate a rapid response.16 
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When practicable, Points of Dispensing (PODs) for countermeasure distribution even 
for one community, much less a region, should be designated in a way that provides 
comprehensive coverage for an area and ensures accessibility for residents all the while 
ensuring sufficient space between sites and within operational areas to minimize the 
challenges associated with crowd control. Steven Harrison, the assistant director of 
emergency operations, planning and logistics for the Virginia Department of Health, 
further contributes that non-traditional dispensing modalities such as drive-through 
dispensing and institutional delivery can be used in conjunction with PODs to help 
reduce the number of citizens reporting to individual sites.17  
In the event of a biological disease outbreak, adequate space for triage, dispensing, 
patient care, and counseling should be provided when possible.18 Within the POD, 
maintaining order through validated procedures would be necessary to ensure efficiency 
and prevent secondary infections where applicable. Personnel working in the PODs 
must be provided for in terms of their own health and safety through the provisioning of 
PPE and security as needed.   
A discussion of CHCs as points of dispensing for countermeasures and mass 
prophylaxis is not a new idea and several centers have already instituted agreements 
with officials to serve in this capacity.19 Again, CHCs are placed in a location that 
deliberately and thoroughly considers the level of accessibility to the target population. 
Many are in urban areas, are public transit accessible (where available), are proximate 
to their target populations, and most offer transportation services to fill the gap.   
According to Dr. Joseph V. Saitta, the emergency services coordinator for the 
Rappahannock Area Health District in Virginia, using the BERM model to calculate 
PODs and the number of people needed to staff them, would demonstrate that in many 
communities the typical health department could not do it alone. The health department 
would commit both its own staff and all available volunteers that it could muster from 
the Medical Reserve Corps, the regional Volunteer Organizations Active in Disaster 
(VOAD), and the area’s Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT) to the 
incident. Depending on the nature, magnitude, and location of an outbreak, it is 
conceivable that a CHC might run a POD by itself, though the health department would 
make every attempt to provide staff or volunteers to help whenever possible.20 
The commitment to act as a POD, however, is not a matter to be taken lightly and 
should be preceded with a discussion of responsibilities and expectations. To be 
successful, a POD must be well integrated in relevant incident command systems as they 
will be reliant on these structures for resources and other types of support. If the CHC 
anticipates providing their own staff for such purposes, they should ensure that 
personnel are knowledgeable of the need for such measures, the threats that could 
surface, and the safety considerations that have been planned for on their behalf.  It will 
require a trained staff that can appropriately communicate with patients to provide 
necessary information and manage patient flow. It will require an exercised triaging 
system that is merely a “good idea” at this early stage of development for many CHCs 
moving towards emergency preparedness. While just-in-time training may be provided, 
preparing staff in advance for this response role may convey the importance of their 
efforts and help to alleviate the concerns that researchers have shown as contributing to 
a worker’s unwillingness to respond.21 At a minimum, CHCs serving as PODs should 
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engage in continuous incident command training for new staff, refresher training for 
existing staff, and exercises when possible to assess the site’s capabilities and improve 
coordination in the community.  Beyond these basics, personnel policies may need to be 
revised to encourage sick employees to stay home, well employees to report for duty, 
and all employees to feel secure during an incident. Clearly, sustained relationships and 
coordination with local health departments are the initial step for moving in this 
direction. Beyond these obvious partnerships, first responders as a whole would need to 
be educated on the role of the CHC-POD to appropriately direct citizens and provide 
support when needed.  
Mass Casualty Care 
The mass casualty care aspect of the Public Health and Medical Preparedness Strategy 
is an ambitious undertaking of the federal government and is envisioned to offer an 
“operational concept for the medical response to catastrophic health events that is 
substantively distinct from and broader than that which guides day-to-day 
operations.”22 The main components of this enterprise, to date, include the Modular 
Emergency Medical System (MEMS), the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), 
and the Medical Reserve Corps (MRC).   
The MEMS concept is based on the rapid organization of expandable patient care 
modules, and provides the structure and space to process up to 1,000 patients per day 
for each unit,23 ultimately expanding capacity and directing those in need to the 
appropriate care. The MEMS is intended for setup near local hospitals to manage the 
flow of patients in a systematic way to alleviate surge on area hospitals. The MEMS 
requires a staff of 500 persons per twelve-hour shift representing a variety of medical 
disciplines to operate at full capacity.24 It should also be noted that the MEMS has an 
important limitation of being “one practical approach to managing a major non-
communicable incident [emphasis added].”25  
The NDMS on the other hand is a volunteer program implemented with the purpose 
of augmenting the nation’s medical response capability by assisting state and local 
authorities in dealing with the medical impacts of major peacetime disasters.26 Once 
activated, NDMS response personnel are federalized and are protected by the Federal 
Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for medical malpractice claims and have recognized credentials 
in any state. 
Finally, the MRC is a community-based network of volunteers (similar to the NDMS) 
that is organized to “improve the health and safety of communities across the country by 
organizing and utilizing public health, medical, and other volunteers.”27 MRC units are 
largely composed of active medical personnel from area hospitals and healthcare 
systems and retired medical personnel who maintain their licenses and credentialing, 
among other professions. MRC units have been identified at the local and state levels as 
possible resources for meeting part of the staffing demands to operate the MEMS until, 
and if, federal resources can be deployed.    
While these programs may be a practical response to a number of incidents these 
entities could in and of themselves cause a range of unintended consequences during a 
pandemic illness. For the most part these programs rely on volunteers, which could 
present a number of challenges. For example, John B. Delaney argues that the NDMS 
will be proven futile during a pandemic disease outbreak and urges the federal 
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government, knowing of the systems limitations, to stop propagating them as a 
resource. Specifically, he points out that long deployments away from family and intense 
patient contact coupled with responders’ fear for personal safety and their family’s well-
being will be a major deterrent for these volunteers to volunteer.28 This argument 
should not be limited solely to NDMS. As a community resource, the MRC may be able 
to garner more support, but inevitably will see their resources drastically cut as well. 
Moreover, the counts for many of our emergency response assets may be inflated.29 The 
NDMS and MRC depend on volunteers to function, many of whom are being double-
counted because they belong to more than one volunteer emergency support program 
like Community Emergency Response Programs or the Red Cross.30 The resource count 
for these systems could be further diminished during an emergency because of either an 
unwillingness to respond or an inability due to professional obligations in their own 
communities.   
Pandemic by definition indicates that the response partners we would ordinarily 
expect to assist will be grappling with the same issues in their own communities.31 
Activating personnel through NDMS or the MRC would be of limited use under the 
pandemic scenario without creating undue hardship in the practitioners’ originating 
community and/or facility; this, of course, assumes that there even is interest from the 
teams. These teams may be viable under many of the national planning scenarios, but 
would still struggle to quickly meet the staffing demands of the MEMS.32     
By enabling CHC penetration, nurturing their emergency preparedness and response 
capabilities, and priming personnel for personal preparedness, CHCs can effectively and 
systematically help to alleviate surge pressures by acting as “alternate care sites” and 
tending to the needs of the “worried well” and/or “walking wounded.” In some 
instances, CHC medical practitioners could be prepared to rapidly fill a number of the 
positions that the MEMS would need to function without compromising any other 
locales, a concept more generally referred to as “community-based surge capacity.”33   
In 2007, the Office of the Press Secretary announced that it is the policy of the United 
States to ensure a “rapid public health and medical response that marshals all available 
national capabilities and capacities in a rapid and coordinated manner.”34 CHCs, as 
federally-funded entities, may be obligated to support response efforts by federal 
mandate. CHCs located within those jurisdictions having reformed their statutes per the 
Model State Emergency Health Powers Act (MSEHPA)35 may be obligated to support 
response efforts by state mandate.36 As providers of primary care services, CHCs may 
have a regulatory obligation, at the very least, to treat their rolls of existing patients.37 
Finally, those CHCs holding recognition as the sole medical provider in their respective 
communities may confront an overwhelming ethical obligation to provide care. Dr. D. 
Bradley Drawbaugh, executive director of Highland Medical Center in Virginia, further 
contributes that the healthcare system has been entrusted by the public to be prepared; 
when you betray that trust, it takes a long time to earn it back. “I’ve seen firsthand – the 
jobs lost and careers ruined when emergency preparedness is an afterthought. Crisis 
management is never good management when it commences during a crisis.”38 
In the end, the will to respond is a personal decision – volunteer or otherwise. 
However, by actively engaging in emergency management planning as a function of the 
workplace, thoroughly considering the needs of employees to execute response plans, 
and demonstrating appropriate provisions through incident command system 
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integration, a CHC may be able to provide the assurance needed to compel their 
practitioners to respond.    
Community Resilience 
Perhaps the most significant contribution CHCs can offer during a catastrophic health 
event would be promoting community resilience in the sphere of public health and 
medical preparedness. By providing citizen education, coordinated risk 
communications, community outreach, and basic medical services, CHCs as an 
organized force spanning the nation could assure the worried well, tend to the walking 
wounded, and support the special needs populations. 
The worried well can unknowingly increase infection rates by inadvertently exposing 
themselves and others by seeking unnecessary treatment.39 CHCs could serve as triage 
centers or alternate care sites for the walking wounded, consequently helping to manage 
the demand for services on area hospitals.40 Finally, CHCs could continue to provide the 
medical home their vulnerable populations have come to know and trust. Without 
adequate attention, each of these groups could needlessly overwhelm the lifesaving 
capacities that only the more advanced treatment facilities may be able to offer.41 
A recent survey administered in Kentucky revealed that a doctor’s office was the most 
frequently mentioned resource individuals would turn to for health information.42 While 
a CHC is unlikely to play a direct role in the development of needed educational and 
informational materials, it is prudent to embrace them as critical partners for the 
dissemination of such information. Dr. Karen Remley, the state health commissioner for 
the Virginia Department of Health, established that citizens trust their primary care 
physicians as the primary source of information. She continued, “We [the state] want 
primary care physicians to trust us as the primary source of information,” but as of yet 
the appropriate communication channel is obscure.43 Since the public-private divide 
permeates healthcare as it does most of the nation’s critical infrastructure, resolution of 
this issue may continue to be elusive. In the meantime, however, it is a reasonable 
starting point to connect with the CHCs. State and federal agencies may utilize any 
number of information networks to keep citizens informed; in the end, however, the 
public will want this information confirmed by their medical providers. 
Ultimately, CHCs may prove to be the crutch of the community by supporting the 
whole spectrum of emergency management activities to minimize the economic impacts 
and the loss of life due to a biological disease outbreak or other public health emergency. 
THE CASE FOR IMPLEMENTATION 
Strategically enlarging the Health Center Program and its preparedness capabilities is a 
dual-purpose investment: enhancing emergency preparedness by supporting the 
objectives identified in HSPD-21 and creating greater social equity. This section 
discusses the Health Center Program through a values lens and specifically considers 
the principles of health, justice, transparency, and accountability. 
Deborah Stone offers the goals of equity, efficiency, security, and liberty as crucial 
objectives of policy analysis.  She warns us however, that “these values are ‘motherhood 
issues’: everyone is for them when they are stated abstractly, but the fight begins as soon 
as we ask what people mean by them.”44 For example, ensuring security often comes at 
WOOD, COMMUNITY HEALTH CENTER S AND PREPAREDNESS 
 
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME V, NO. 1 (JANUARY 2009) WWW.HSAJ.ORG  
 
9 
the price of liberty; protecting liberty can equate to diminished security; and promoting 
equality and security through redistributive policies may, from perspectives, occur at the 
expense of efficiencies. 
This strategy is an opportunity to move toward enhanced security while keeping 
infringements on liberty as minimal as possible and moving down the path already 
envisioned and authorized in HSPD-21 and the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism 
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002,45 respectively. It is the opportunity to promote 
equality while relying on the existing administrative infrastructure that has made 
proven contributions to enhancing social equity and has been documented as possibly 
more efficient than some of the alternatives. Finally, the benefits, especially during a 
pandemic, would be more evenly distributed among the population as compared to 
many of the existing initiatives. According to George J. Annas and others: 
Both history and current events demonstrate the need for a new, positive 
paradigm for pandemic preparedness, one that harnesses the talents of all 
Americans to take effective action to protect the health of all, instead of punishing 
those who fall ill.  This new paradigm should be based on four fundamental 
principles:  Health, Justice, Transparency, and Accountability.46 
The Health Center Program by creation and mission already exudes these principles. 
The contributions that they make to our nation’s healthcare and the manner by which 
they are organized and regulated lend themselves to being in near perfect harmony with 
this paradigm. 
Health and Justice 
Public discourse and academic research has established that the United States is in the 
midst of a healthcare crisis with the number of persons presenting without medical 
insurance reaching dangerously high levels and impacting service delivery and the 
accessibility of basic healthcare.47 This has created comparatively greater hardship for 
racial and ethnic minorities in this country, as was substantiated by an Institute of 
Medicine report documenting inequities in medical treatment among these groups.48 
Even when these individuals have the same health insurance and similar access to a 
health care provider as non-minorities, research indicates that minorities tend to receive 
a lower quality of healthcare (e.g. not receiving the needed services, receiving less 
desirable services) than whites.49 Much of the argument points to the need to socialize 
healthcare in some form or another to reduce healthcare costs, minimize or eliminate 
health disparities, and provide universal access to residents of the United States. While 
some individuals may not view the public financing of healthcare as desirable, the social 
and economic costs of inequities in health are a cost shared by all.50 For example, the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention indicates that costs associated with chronic 
diseases – the most common and the most costly – account for more than 70 percent of 
the $1 trillion in U.S. healthcare expenditures each year.51 Chronic diseases are largely 
preventable diseases.52 Therefore, reductions in the prevalence of disease, in any 
population, should in turn accrue healthcare cost savings and other benefits for all. As it 
happens, health disparities research demonstrates vulnerable populations suffer a 
disproportionate share of the chronic disease burden.53 
As a federal program, the CHCs have made significant contributions in this domain. 
“Health centers are a principle strategy for anchoring accessible, high quality primary 
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health care in pervasively poor and uninsured communities that, without such 
investment, could not hope to independently attract and support sufficient private 
medical care practices.”54 
The same factors of quality health care accessibility that have contributed to health 
disparities in racial and ethnic minorities will similarly surface during a public health 
crisis but could potentially result in higher consequences for these vulnerable 
populations and the medical infrastructure as a whole. The need to systematically and 
concretely conduct emergency planning to meet the needs of the socially disadvantaged 
has been advocated by numerous researchers and emergency management professionals 
and is captured in a distinct course offered through FEMA’s Emergency Management 
Institute.55 Fortunately, a niche profession of special-needs emergency planners has 
surfaced to provide leadership in this domain. Special-needs populations can be defined 
as “groups whose needs may not be fully addressed by traditional service providers or 
who feel they may not comfortably or safely access and use the standard resources 
offered in disaster preparedness, response, relief, and recovery.”56 Planning for special-
needs or vulnerable populations has received significant attention recently as evidenced 
by its inclusion in the Congressional Research Service Report, Public Health Medical 
Preparedness and Response: Issues in the 110th Congress and the Homeland Security 
Programs Grant (HSPG) guidance where it receives mention as an “area of paramount 
concern.”57 
A large portion of these special-needs populations comprise CHCs’ target populations 
and vice versa. Through expansion of the Health Center Program and dedicated funding 
to create robust emergency management programs within CHCs, the administration can 
make substantial improvements in healthcare accessibility and cost, reduce health 
disparities,58 and positively improve the nation’s public health and medical 
preparedness. With dedicated support, CHCs could be well positioned to be 
fundamental agents for these groups during a public health crisis and other 
emergencies.   
During non-emergency operations the provision of primary and preventive 
healthcare to underserved populations saves the system money in both the short and 
long term. CHCs already save the national health care system between $9.9 billion and 
$17.6 billion a year by helping patients avoid emergency room visits through better use 
of preventive services,59 but an additional $18 billion still aggregates each year from 
emergency room visits that could have and should have been managed through health 
center providers.60 The expectation during emergency operations is that care would be 
more widely available to not only the special-needs populations, but to the greater 
population as a whole through the systematic management of the afflicted and the 
concerned, ultimately ensuring that those in need of specialized care will have an 
improved chance of access by preventing and mitigating infection and subsequent surge 
up front. Even without significant CHC expansion, improved coordination and 
integration could augment medical preparedness and response capabilities. 
While risk-based programs for emergency management funding like the Urban Areas 
Security Initiative (UASI) or the Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) are 
clearly warranted on some level, emergency management competencies should be 
established and maintained in a manner that provides a basic level of security for all.  
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Transparency and Accountability 
As federally qualified health centers (FQHC), regulated by the Bureau of Primary Health 
Care (BPHC) in the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) of the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the administrative infrastructure 
and accountability mechanisms are already in place to groom CHCs for an active and 
measurable role in public health and medical preparedness. “The medical care services 
furnished by health centers are subject to extensive federal requirements, and the 
quality of care is carefully monitored in accordance with federal clinical care 
standards.”61   
Every three to five years, FQHCs must reapply for funding through “Service Area 
Competitions” managed and administered by HRSA. Within HRSA, a number of offices 
impact the overall administration of community health centers, but the greatest 
concentration of oversight and program guidance is directed through BPHC. 
Meanwhile, the Healthcare System Bureau, within HRSA, is dedicated to “the 
facilitation of the development of state, territorial, and municipal preparedness 
programs to enhance the capacity of the nation’s hospitals and other healthcare entities 
to respond to mass casualty incidents caused by terrorism and other public health 
emergencies,”62 and is further coordinated at a higher level through the Office of the 
Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) located within HHS. In their 
article, Emergency Management Planning as Collaborative Community Work, Wendy 
A. Shafer and others warn that strictly top-down reforms “could fail to effectively 
leverage (or perhaps take notice at all of) locally based resources that could play useful, 
and perhaps critical roles in given emergency operations.”63 Perhaps the viability of 
CHCs as an integral component of public health and medical preparedness was 
somehow lost on this large, complex bureaucracy. Nonetheless, this bureaucracy is 
precisely the regulatory structure that is needed to assure transparency and 
accountability for any country-wide preparedness initiative.             
Another useful component of the Health Center Program’s administrative 
infrastructure is the Primary Care Association (PCA). Each state has a PCA at the service 
of member centers to provide training and technical assistance. HHS may be able to 
coordinate preparedness initiatives through the PCA to streamline the funding process, 
ensure consistency across programs, and actually measure progress in a meaningful way 
and on a scale that would support strategic planning. 
BARRIERS TO IMPLEMENTATION 
At this time, the BPHC has imposed a relatively ambiguous framework for emergency 
management programs in health centers. They mandate all-hazards preparedness yet 
hamper such efforts by maintaining barriers that essentially bar CHCs from progressive 
integration with the system. These barriers largely include inadequate funding, a 
restrictive regulatory environment, and ground-level integration challenges. 
Policy Information Notice (PIN) 2007-15: Emergency Preparedness and the 
Potential Role of Health Centers in Community Response, acknowledges the health 
centers’ ability to support homeland security efforts and encourages them to understand  
and institutionalize NIMS and understand the National Response Framework (NRF) 
while recommending typical emergency management concepts, e.g., interagency 
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coordination, interoperability, proactive planning, risk communications, etc.64 
Unfortunately, PIN 2007-15 stands to serve a much more symbolic, rather than 
operational, framework because funding for such preparedness activities is nominal, if 
existent at all. According to a recent study conducted by the National Association of 
Community Health Centers (NACHC), of the $1.54 billion awarded for public health and 
healthcare emergency management programs nationwide in 2006, only 0.7 percent or 
$11.1 million was awarded to PCAs and/or CHCs.65 A few CHCs have been successful 
obtaining funding and support through the risk-based programs mentioned earlier, the 
CDC’s Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) Cooperative Agreement, and the 
Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP) which specifically prompts inclusion of CHCs in 
planning efforts. For example, every CHC in New Jersey receives $25,000 per year to 
support emergency preparedness and response activities from the HPP.66 Their PCA is 
also well-funded to support this effort.67 Similarly, Missouri CHCs receive nearly 
$11,000 each per year while retaining a funded PCA.68  Toward the other end of the 
spectrum, the Michigan PCA boasts only a few thousand dollars from the HPP with no 
direct funding to CHCs.69  In Virginia, at the time of writing, CHCs have only just been 
formally approached regarding participation in the HPP. Before funding becomes a 
discussion topic, however, Virginia’s twenty-three CHCs, representing 129 service 
delivery sites,70 will need to engage in extensive fact-finding accompanied by a 
presumably lengthy induction with one or more of the state’s six Regional Healthcare 
Emergency Planning Committees. With $3.5 million of the $11.1 million in funds  
(described above) being concentrated in California,71 it is safe to assume the 
discretionary distribution of these funds by each state has left more than a few CHCs 
planning in a vacuum. 
To complicate matters, the subsequent PIN issued by the BPHC, Policy Information 
Notice 2007-16: Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) Coverage for Health Center Program 
Grantees Responding to Emergencies, advises that FTCA coverage for health center 
employees and certain contractors providing services during emergencies on behalf of 
the health center, is limited to adjacent jurisdictions and those areas described within 
the center’s approved section 330-grant “scope of project” which specifies very specific 
sites, services, providers, target population, and service areas, but may be amended on a 
case-by-case basis.72 In essence, this means a CHC is restricted from mobilizing to 
respond to an incident. This policy gives little assurance to the health center attempting 
to integrate into this greater emergency management network, which relies on the use of 
mutual aid agreements (the sharing of staff and other resources) and commends them 
as a best practice.   
On the other hand, Program Information Notice 05-19: Federal Tort Claims Act 
Coverage for Deemed Consolidated Health Center Program Grantees Responding to 
Hurricane Katrina, established the precedent of FTCA coverage flexibility during a 
catastrophic incident by permitting some health centers to provide services at 
temporary locations with looser restrictions during Hurricane Katrina.73 While this PIN 
may provide a hint as to how things might unfold during an emergency, it is no more 
than a hint. This uncertainty is detrimental to a rigorous emergency management 
program that in theory stresses all-hazards preparedness and is evaluated by 
conducting realistic exercises.     
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The Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) was 
conceptualized in response to the directive established in HSPD-8 to establish a 
comprehensive training program to meet the national preparedness goal that also 
includes training for the nation’s first responders, officials, and others with major event 
emergency management roles74 and provides a robust model for creating and sustaining 
a progressive capabilities-based training and exercise program utilizing the Target 
Capabilities List (TLC).75 Yet the investment to appropriately embrace this methodology, 
under the described circumstances, is difficult to justify. CHCs could support a variety of 
capabilities identified in the TLC. Some of the more obvious capabilities include 
responder safety and health, mass care, emergency triage and pre-hospital treatment, 
medical surge, medical supplies management and distribution, and mass prophylaxis, 
but could extend to fatality management as well. However, the amount of time and 
money that would be needed just to navigate these complex partnerships and 
interactions is daunting in and of itself; this of course does not even begin to encompass 
the commitment to properly train and exercise staff in these capabilities utilizing the 
HSEEP framework. Most CHCs do not receive any direct federal funding for emergency 
management activities and, in 2006, only an estimated twenty states had planned to 
fund emergency preparedness and response programs in CHCs.76 
According to Robert Housman and Ed Bethune, post 9/11 preparedness mandates are 
smoking guns: “vulnerability assessments that offer long lists of potential risks, large 
numbers of documented security flaws, and large price tags to close these gaps.”77 Tort 
claims are being litigated right now clarifying the “duty to prepare” and the “duty to 
respond.”78 Steven Gravely, J.D., M.H.A., of the Joint Subcommittee Studying the 
Feasibility of Offering Liability Protections to Health Care Providers Rendering Aid 
During a State or Local Emergency in Virginia, warns of multiple suits in Canada against 
health care providers and the government stemming from the failure to use infection 
control measures during the SARS outbreak and similar suits against providers in 
Louisiana alleging the failure to evacuate in a timely manner in response to Hurricane 
Katrina.79 Other claims arising from these incidents include the failure to prepare, the 
failure to have emergency power, the failure to utilize realistic planning assumptions, 
and the failure to anticipate flooding and relocate generators accordingly.80 In light of 
these allegations, it could be argued that the BPHC mandates have left a paper trail for 
tort claims in those CHCs that fail to comply with the emergency management 
expectations outlined in the various PINS and by other relevant regulatory agencies. 
Ultimately, finger pointing could make its way back to the federal government in these 
cases because (1) the PINs arguably contradict the emergency management 
fundamentals of resource support through mutual aid agreements and consequently 
hinder the full exploration of CHCs as potential resources for incident management; and 
(2) funding for the implementation of comprehensive emergency management 
programs in CHCs often appear to be unavailable, insufficient, or amassed by other 
entities whom in turn may be either unaware of or unconcerned with the role of CHCs. 
After all, the Health Center Program is a federal initiative.  
Challenges in the CHC 
Beyond the larger policy issues, CHCs may have to overcome challenges in their 
localities as well. For a CHC to be successful in the emergency preparedness and 
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response realm, it must be integrated in the local emergency management network. Yet 
achieving this needed state of integration is not always an easy feat.  
Currently, the main push for emergency preparedness and response in CHCs revolves 
around the drafting of the EOP. While it is clear that EOPs and the process of developing 
the plan is the foundation of emergency management programs, it is also becoming 
clear that this activity in and of itself may not provide the results intended. Sang O. Choi 
and Ralph S. Brower conducted a study under the assumption that appropriate persons 
tasked with emergency management responsibilities were knowledgeable of their 
relevant EOPS, only to discover that this assumption was far from the truth. 
“Surprisingly, the majority (60.0%) of all organizations appear to understand the plan 
only a little.”81 Louise Comfort and Naim Kapucu add additional concern when they 
assert that “most public agencies have emergency plans, but they are not always 
current” (311).82 Moreover they've found integration inconsistencies with the plans 
themselves. 
Although some private companies and nonprofit organizations such as hospitals 
and schools have emergency plans, they often are not integrated with those of the 
public agencies to provide a comprehensive plan for a community, much less 
multiple communities in an affected region.83 
Without the flexibility to truly integrate, CHCs may easily become stuck in the planning 
mode and never delve any deeper into the areas where they can make the greatest 
impact: personal preparedness initiatives and training to ensure an adequate and 
“ready” workforce capable of supporting biosurveillance efforts, countermeasure 
distribution, mass casualty care, and the provisioning of community education and risk 
communications to strive for the best outcome in their communities under the worst-
case scenarios.  
FEMA offers a long list of recommended activities for NIMS implementation in 
hospitals and healthcare systems including, but not limited to: 
• The adoption of NIMS, continuous efforts to provide NIMS/ICS training, and the 
utilization of exercises to determine corrective actions; 
• Promoting and supporting mutual aid agreements, the maintenance of 
inventoried response assets, and the use of integrated Multi-Agency Coordination 
Systems (MACs); 
• The implementation of public information systems and all-hazards exercise 
programs.84     
Without dedicated personnel and funding, these activities will be extremely difficult for 
a CHC to implement and as it stands now, every dollar spent on preparedness is a dollar 
taken away from clinical programs.  
It should not be assumed that a Local Emergency Management Committee (LEMC) 
has the means and foresight to include CHCs in preparedness activities and further the 
structure and incentive to maintain and report such progress. Many jurisdictions are 
overwhelmed by the challenge of achieving even basic NIMS compliance in their 
agencies. A study by the Colorado Community Health Network (the Colorado PCA) 
found that of those CHCs surveyed, those not involved in community planning had 
actually been rejected by the community with one respondent reportedly being told 
‘We’ll call you if we need you’.85 In contrast to this interaction, Steve Harrison asserts 
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that close collaboration and mutual understanding of response roles is not simply 
needed, but required, to effectively resolve many of the issues necessitating 
consideration prior to and during a public health incident.86   
Creating an emergency management program that is responsive to the needs and 
particular nuances of the individual CHC is a tall order. The resources and capabilities 
of each one can be quite varied. Some of the rural health programs, for example, may 
not have the staff to attend long trainings without completely shutting down their 
operations. Meanwhile, as the sole healthcare provider within a particular area, their 
facility may be the one that could benefit the most from these interactions. With cuts in 
Medicaid expenditures, resulting in a higher number of uninsured people seeking 
services, more centers struggle with their day-to-day finances, which ultimately 
constrains their ability to effectively undertake emergency management planning and all 
that a quality program entails. The case of the Eastern Shore Rural Health System 
(ESRHS), the most progressive CHC in terms of emergency management in Virginia, 
demonstrates these tensions.    
In Virginia, the Eastern Shore Rural Health System (ESRHS) operates five 
community health centers along the eighty-mile stretch of land between the Chesapeake 
Bay and the Atlantic Ocean. With more than 50,000 residents, only one area hospital 
with 180 beds, and at least half of the population relying on ESRHS for their care, 
ESRHS partnered with their local health department as early as 2002 to begin 
emergency planning.87 They developed relationships with the local hospital and area 
emergency management personnel and eventually formalized these partnerships 
through the creation of the Eastern Shore Disaster Preparedness Coalition.88 ESRHS 
has been very active with the coalition and initially attempted to support community 
exercises with each of their health centers every year, but it soon became apparent that 
the time commitment to plan and coordinate these events was too much and that 
ESRHS could generally only permit one center to participate per year.  Since ESRHS is 
very well integrated with their local emergency management network and is fairly 
confident in their response roles through their local ICS, the abated exercise schedule is 
less of a concern than the possibility of losing contact during an incident.89   
The ESRHS is probably the most capable CHC in the state (at this point) for 
supporting incident response and they are actually located quite close to the Norfolk 
UASI jurisdictions. In fact, roughly 41 percent or 2,882 CHC service delivery sites are 
located within candidate urban areas queried by the Department of Homeland Security 
as part of their overall risk methodology90 (see Appendix for CHC counts by state and 
relevant Metropolitan Statistical Area). Yet FTCA guidelines would prevent them from 
quickly responding to an incident in most of the state’s UASI areas due to the coverage 
guidelines discussed previously.  
RECOMMENDATIONS 
In Biodefense for the 21st Century, the United States declared that it “will continue to 
use all means necessary to prevent, protect against, and mitigate biological weapons 
attacks perpetrated against our homeland and our global interests” [emphasis added].91 
The preceding discussion points to a means that is clearly necessary. Supporting the 
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Public Health and Medical Preparedness Strategy to the greatest extent possible, 
however, hinges on a few critical recommendations:   
Remove Regulatory Barriers 
The National Strategy for Homeland Security states that the nation must develop 
“interconnected and complementary homeland security systems that are reinforcing 
rather than duplicative and that ensure essential requirements are met.”92 In 2005 DHS 
announced the national priorities, in the Interim National Preparedness Goal, one of 
which includes the goal of strengthening “medical surge and mass prophylaxis 
capabilities by establishing emergency-ready public health and healthcare entities” and 
another calling for “expanded regional collaboration through mutual aid agreements 
and assistance compacts.”93 These goals point to the development of specific capabilities 
and specify the means for getting there. Meanwhile, CHC participation is limited 
because the current guidelines for granting medical malpractice insurance through the 
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) have all but ensured their paralysis. 
First and foremost, FTCA coverage must be determined in a way that supports rather 
than contradicts emergency management programs. In emergency management, mutual 
aid agreements and memorandums of understanding provide the framework for 
requesting resources during an incident response. In light of these regulations, CHCs 
may provide supplies and equipment but are quite restricted in the use of personnel. 
This equates to an underutilized asset of more than 36,900 medical care providers, 
more than 2,700 mental health providers, and nearly 105,000 personnel in total across 
the U.S., providing patient services.94 Despite this barrier, health centers treated more 
than 19,000 evacuees in Louisiana and nearly 18,000 in Mississippi after Hurricane 
Katrina – nearly 80 percent of whom did not have health insurance.95 
At a minimum, FTCA coverage should be designated in a way that permits staff-
sharing between centers and their temporary sites or provides specific assurance that 
coverage will be extended under certain circumstances. For example, the guidelines 
could state that coverage will be provided during a state declared disaster for intrastate 
practitioners responding to a Type-2 Incident or coverage will be extended if WHO 
Pandemic Phase 5 is signaled.96 This will facilitate preparedness at the local and state 
levels by instantly boosting medical response capabilities and will enhance preparedness 
at the national level by creating the flexibility and assurance for CHCs to begin 
integrated training and exercise programs with other stakeholders. Those CHCs 
formerly rejected by their LEMC, or those residing in inactive jurisdictions, could 
pursue alternative partners from a broader jurisdictional perspective and ultimately 
pursue NIMS compliance where formerly their success would have been predicated on 
their immediate community’s interest in and ability to integrate them. CHCs and their 
respective PCAs could then begin to link into Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) 
and other multiagency coordination systems and vice versa with greater efficiency. 
Ideally, the NDMS model of FTCA coverage and recognized credentialing across state 
lines should be extended to CHC personnel to promote all-hazards preparedness. To 
reiterate, FTCA coverage for providers will only be extended when services provided are 
consistent with those identified in the CHCs’ “scope of project,” including sites, services, 
service areas, and target populations (target populations generally meaning medically 
underserved and/or vulnerable populations). Ironically, the threat of pandemic 
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influenza and the looming medical response shortage raises the probability that every 
citizen will be medically underserved. During a pandemic event,  CHC personnel (after 
stabilizing their own communities) perhaps could provide temporary assistance through 
partner CHCs in those jurisdictions still struggling with the incident. 
Enable CHC Growth to Ensure an Evenly Distributed Public 
Health Response 
The Institute of Medicine praised health centers for providing care that is “at least as 
good as, and in many cases superior to, the overall health system in terms of better 
quality and lower costs.”97 Moreover, Jack Hadley and Peter Cunningham suggest that 
CHC expansion reduces the reliance on more expensive hospital resources, ultimately 
improving delivery system efficiency and offsetting the costs of expanding CHC 
capacity.98 Aaron Katz and others describe CHCs as well situated in some communities 
to be the first line of response during public health emergencies and warned that 
reductions in public health infrastructure investments could erode newfound capacity in 
community preparedness.99 The list of various reports and research supporting CHCs 
goes on and on.100, Denise Santiago and Anke Richter, however, caution against the 
reliance on “dual-use functionality” for public health preparedness pointing to the 
obvious assumption that the concept assumes that there were sufficient resources for 
“single use.”101 The demand for services during a public health emergency will certainly 
overwhelm existing capabilities. Even future infrastructure development will falter 
during a WMD attack or biological disease outbreak. Yet until health care accessibility 
provides for a more equitable distribution there should be little reservation in moving 
forward on capacity building. “Congress and the agencies must address the fact that 
many critical systems on which the nation will rely during future emergencies are 
already overstrained. This applies in particular to health care and public health 
sectors.”102 
Use the Administrative Infrastructure to Promote Health, Justice, 
Transparency, and Accountability 
PCAs, the state-level associations for CHCs, receive funding authorized under the Public 
Health Service Act to provide “assistance to Statewide organizations in the development 
and delivery of comprehensive primary health care service in areas that lack adequate 
numbers of health professionals or have populations lacking access to primary care 
services” and “technical and non-financial assistance to community-based providers of 
comprehensive primary and preventive care for underserved and vulnerable 
populations.”103  
Training and technical assistance for emergency management is quickly being added 
to the list of services provided through the PCA, but the breadth and quality of those 
programs, if implemented, will largely be dependent on their level of funding. Costly 
consultants can easily be brought in for a quick presentation on risk communications or 
personal preparedness. The challenge though is connecting those needs to the CHC and 
the CHC to the emergency management network and the resources to the CHC so that 
those needs result in implementation actions. None of this can be accomplished in a 
significant way if done in isolation.  
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The Association of State and Territorial Health Officials (ASTHO) described the 
following roles that PCAs could use to facilitate emergency preparedness and response: 
 
• Represent CHCs at state emergency planning tables; 
• Provide training and technical assistance to CHCs as they develop their 
emergency operations plan; 
• Serve as the communication link between CHCs and government resources.104 
A more recent report by ASTHO describes partnerships forged between some state 
health agencies, PCAs, and CHCs to improve emergency preparedness. Some of these 
efforts include, but are not limited to: defining emergency response roles in California; 
enhancing surge capacity in Massachusetts, resource integration in Arkansas, 
emergency preparedness training for health centers in Maine, and infectious disease 
control in New York; and building health care coalitions in the state of Washington.105 
These successes should certainly serve as models for improving coordination and 
integration at the state and local levels.  
Working through the PCA could be a means to facilitate the coordination and 
execution of many public health and medical preparedness activities through a more 
manageable program design. It would create another layer of accountability and 
positions the CHC and the PCA to take advantage of pull and push strategies for creating 
awareness and improving integration at the local, regional, and state levels.  
CONCLUSION 
If CHCs are to be contributing partners in public health and medical preparedness, 
funding must be made available that supports a minimum level of preparedness for all 
centers. With more than 36,900 medical professionals across the nation to prepare for 
emergency preparedness, the funding is needed and has the potential to engage a 
previously untapped resource.     
As potential PODs for countermeasures and mass prophylaxis, certain personnel will 
need to take the full spectrum of NIMS and ICS training and engage in community 
and/or state exercises. To effectively contribute to biosurveillance or mass casualty care, 
certain personnel will need bioterrorism training and the opportunity to participate in 
relevant drills. Finally, to be a key player in community resilience, CHCs need the 
recognition and support from the emergency management network across agencies and 
all levels of government. 
Even though coordination, collaboration, and communication are the mantras of 
emergency management, this networked vision has yet to be achieved on a large scale. 
Public health has only recently joined the ranks of the first responders and the titling of 
whom meets this classification is still gray for many even within the emergency 
management and homeland security professions. Including CHC representation on the 
occasional advisory committee without soliciting feedback, without appropriating 
funding to them, and without publicly acknowledging their role will do little to move the 
relationship forward. “Our entire response framework is predicated on a coordinated 
response that spreads across jurisdictions and up jurisdictional channels as resources 
are exhausted.”106 Outside of local EMS resources, public health is not well organized to 
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contribute to this model and certainly not in the capacity envisioned by the Public 
Health and Medical Preparedness Strategy.   
Expanding the Health Center Program and embracing these entities as critical 
partners in the Public Health and Medical Preparedness Strategy is a viable strategy by 
first striking a reasonable balance between many of our contending values, and second 
by staying within our comfort zone in terms of incremental policy change by relying on 
existing administrative infrastructure and expanding capabilities rather than creating 
new entities to achieve them. 
The entities we do have (i.e., NDMS, MRC) cannot be held accountable to meet 
FEMA’s training and exercise standards nor the actual response needs outlined in the 
nation’s preparedness architecture. Hospitals are already running at or beyond capacity. 
According to a recent real-time congressional survey of Level I Trauma Centers, 
conducted by the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, none of the 
hospitals surveyed had enough critical care capacity or inpatient beds available to 
absorb a sudden influx from a mass casualty event (the “less severely injured” were 
included in the counts).107 It is quite possible that improved performance could have 
been realized had those “less severely injured” individuals been considered for 
treatment at nearby CHCs. Health departments have missions and responsibilities that 
delve into a wide array of programs, some preparedness related and many others not. 
Since these agencies are generally understaffed themselves, consideration must be given 
to other resources that are well-positioned to assist them in their preparedness and 
response efforts. Private physicians, medical centers, clinics, and every other healthcare 
system in existence should be incorporating emergency management programs into 
their operations to address those areas identified in HSPD-21. Unfortunately many of 
those entities do not generally have the bureaucratic structure in place to ensure 
transparency and accountability. When they do, their distribution does not generally 
reflect a system that promotes health and justice; if it did, CHCs would not exist.   
According to HRSA’s Elizabeth Duke “health centers have been identified by the OMB 
as one of the federal government’s most successful programs.”108 Through a thoughtful 
revisioning that broadens the program’s scope to include strategic emergency planning, 
CHCs – with support – can build on what they already do well to augment our nation’s 
public health and medical preparedness capabilities. 
This article is not intended to minimize the progress made over the past few years or 
to imply that CHCs have gone completely unnoticed – some are very well integrated and 
funded in their particular communities. Further, it is not intended to acclaim the Health 
Center Program as the sole solution to the Public Health and Medical Preparedness 
Strategy. The goal is to highlight the untapped resources that, through the proper 
attention to funding and development, can enhance the nation’s public health and 
medical preparedness. CHCs can provide biosurveillance in the populations that may be 
the first to signal a public health emergency, by serving as PODs in those areas that that 
are closest to special needs populations, by supporting mass casualty care efforts by 
mitigating surge at the onset and providing a supply of competent professionals 
dedicated to the public interest, and ultimately ensuring community resilience by 
leveraging their existing capabilities and relationships to ease their communities 
through a public health catastrophe. “It is the policy of the United States to plan and 
enable provision for the public health and medical needs of the American people in the 
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case of a catastrophic health event through continual and timely flow of information 
during such an event and rapid public health and medical response that marshals all 
available national capabilities and capacities in a rapid and coordinated manner.”109 
CHCs can be, should be, and may be front line public health responders whether they 
are prepared or not.   
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CHC Prevalence in Candidate Urban Areas under the FY 2008 UASI Program 
Tier 1 Urban Areas 
State Candidate Urban Area by Metropolitan Statistical Area110 
Counties and Cities111 
Selected for Query 
CHC112 
Counts 
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana Area Los Angeles County 134 
Alameda County 
Contra Costa County 
Marin County 
San Benito County 
San Franciso County 
San Mateo County 
CA 
San Francisco-San Jose-Bay Area 
Santa Clara County 196 









IL Chicago-Naperville-Joliet Area, IL-IN-WI 




IN Chicago-Naperville-Joliet Area, IL-IN-WI 





MD Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV Area 










Somerset County  
Sussex County 
NJ Newark Area 
Union County 62 
Bronx County 
Kings County NY New York-Long Island Area 
Nassau County   
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CHC Prevalence in Candidate Urban Areas under the FY 2008 UASI Program 
Tier 1 Urban Areas 
State Candidate Urban Area by Metropolitan Statistical Area 
Counties and Cities 












NY New York-Long Island Area (continued) 
Westchester County 283 









San Jacinto County 
TX Houston Area 











Manassas Park City 
Prince William County 
Spotsylvania County 
Stafford County 
VA Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV Area 
Warren County 7 
WI Chicago-Naperville-Joliet Area, IL-IN-WI Kenosha County 1 
WV Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV Area Jefferson County 1 
Tier 1 Total 1,092 
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CHC Prevalence in Candidate Urban Areas under the FY 2008 UASI Program 
Tier 2 Urban Areas 
State Candidate Urban Area by Metropolitan Statistical Area 
Counties and Cities 
Selected for Query 
CHC 
Count 
AR Memphis Area, TN-MS-AR Crittenden County 2 
Maricopa County Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale Area 




Pima County 54 
Santa Ana-Anaheim-Irvine Area Orange County 9 




Yolo County 17 
San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos Area San Diego County 101 
Riverside County 
CA 
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario Area 










CO Denver-Aurora Area 
Park County 45 
Hartford County 
Middlesex County Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford Area 
Tolland County 42 
CT 
Birdgeport-Stamford-Norwalk Area Fairfield County 31 
DE Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington Area, PA-NJ-DE-MD New Castle County 5 
Broward County Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach Area 






St. Johns County 7 
Miami-Dade County Miami Area 






Seminole County 5 
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CHC Prevalence in Candidate Urban Areas under the FY 2008 UASI Program 
Tier 2 Urban Areas 
State Candidate Urban Area by Metropolitan Statistical Area 
Counties and Cities 






FL Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater Area 




























GA Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta Area 
Walton County 32 
HI Honolulu Area Honolulu County 28 
Dearborn County 
Franklin County Cincinnati-Middletown Area, OH-KY-IN 








Johnson County   
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CHC Prevalence in Candidate Urban Areas under the FY 2008 UASI Program 
Tier 2 Urban Areas 
State Candidate Urban Area by Metropolitan Statistical Area 
Counties and Cities 
Selected for Query 
CHC 
Count 
Marion County   
Morgan County   
Putnam County   
Indianapolis-Carmel Area (continued) 





Louisville/Jefferson County Area, KY-IN 







IL St. Louis, MO-IL Area 






KS Kansas City Area, MO-KS 









Louisville/Jefferson County Area, KY-IN 








Cincinnati-Middletown Area, OH-KY-IN 
Pendleton County 21 
Ascension Parish 
East Baton Rouge Parish 
East Feliciana Parish 
Iberville Parish 
LA Baton Rouge Area 
Livingston Parish   
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CHC Prevalence in Candidate Urban Areas under the FY 2008 UASI Program 
Tier 2 Urban Areas 
State Candidate Urban Area by Metropolitan Statistical Area 
Counties and Cities 
Selected for Query 
CHC 
Count 
Pointe Coupee Parish 
St. Helena Parish 
West Baton Rouge Parish 
Baton Rouge Area (continued) 




St. Bernard Parish 
St. Charles Parish 
St. John the Baptist Parish 
LA 
New Orleans-Metairie-Kennar Area 





Boston-Cambridge-Quincy Area, MA-NH 
Suffolk County 114 
MA 
Providence-New Bedford-Fall River Area, RI-MA Bristol County 5 







Queen Anne's County 55 
MD 





St. Clair County 
MI Detroit-Warren-Livonia Area 











MN Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington Area, MN-WI 
Wright County 49 
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CHC Prevalence in Candidate Urban Areas under the FY 2008 UASI Program 
Tier 2 Urban Areas 
State Candidate Urban Area by Metropolitan Statistical Area 
Counties and Cities 











Kansas City Area, MO-KS 
Ray County 14 
Crawford County 
Franklin County   
Jefferson County 
Lincoln County 
St. Charles County 
St. Louis City 
St. Louis County 
Warren County 
MO 
St. Louis, MO-IL Area 




MS Memphis Area, TN-MS-AR 





Charlotte-Gastonia-Concord Area, NC-SC 
Union County 12 
NC 
Norfolk-Virginia Beach, Newport News Area, VA-NC Currituck County 0 
Rockingham County NH Boston-Cambridge-Quincy Area, MA-NH 




NJ Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington Area, PA-NJ-DE-MD 
Salem County 20 






Scholharie County 9 
Erie County  
NY 
Buffalo-Niagara Falls Area 
Niagara County 4 
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CHC Prevalence in Candidate Urban Areas under the FY 2008 UASI Program 
Tier 2 Urban Area 
State Candidate Urban Area by Metropolitan Statistical Area 
Counties and Cities 








Wayne County 31 









Cincinnati-Middletown Area, OH-KY-IN 


























Logan County  
McClain County 
OK Oklahoma City Area 





OR Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton Area, OR-WA 
Yamhill County 76 
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CHC Prevalence in Candidate Urban Areas under the FY 2008 UASI Program 
Tier 2 Urban Area 
State Candidate Urban Area by Metropolitan Statistical Area 
Counties and Cities 







Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington Area, PA-NJ-DE-MD 









Westmoreland County 58 






























PR San Juan-Caguas-Guaynabo Area 
Orocovis Municipio   
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CHC Prevalence in Candidate Urban Areas under the FY 2008 UASI Program 
Tier 2 Urban Area 
State Candidate Urban Area by Metropolitan Statistical Area 
Counties and Cities 




Rio Grande Municipio 
San Juan Municipio 
San Lorenzo Municipio 
Toa Alta Municipio 
Toa Baja Municipio 
Trujillo Alto Municipio 
Vega Alta Municipio 
Vega Baja Municipio 
PR San Juan-Caguas-Guaynabo Area (continued) 





RI Providence-New Bedford-Fall River Area, RI-MA 
Washington County 44 
SC Charlotte-Gastonia-Concord Area, NC-SC York County 5 
Fayette County 
Shelby County Memphis Area, TN-MS-AR 














Nashville-Davidson, Murfreesboro, Franklin Area 





Austin-Round Rock Area 





Dallas-Forth Worth-Arlington Area 
Denton County   
WOOD, COMMUNITY HEALTH CENTER S AND PREPAREDNESS 
 




CHC Prevalence in Candidate Urban Areas under the FY 2008 UASI Program 
Tier 2 Urban Area 
State Candidate Urban Area by Metropolitan Statistical Area 
Counties and Cities 










Dallas-Forth Worth-Arlington Area (continued) 
Wise County 16 









San Antonio Area 
Wilson County 28 
Salt Lake County 
Summit County UT Salt Lake City Area 
Tooele County 10 
Amelia County 
Caroline County 
Charles City County 
Chesterfield County 







King and Queen County 
King William County 
Louisa County 
New Kent County 
Petersburg City 
Powhatan County 
Prince George County 
Richmond City 
Richmond Area 
Sussex County 16 
Chesapeake City 
VA 
Norfolk-Virginia Beach, Newport News Area, VA-NC 
Franklin City   
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CHC Prevalence in Candidate Urban Areas under the FY 2008 UASI Program 
Tier 2 Urban Area 
State Candidate Urban Area by Metropolitan Statistical Area 
Counties and Cities 
Selected for Query 
CHC 
Count 
Gloucester County   
Hampton City 
Isle of Wight County 
James City County 
Mathews County 








Virginia Beach City 
Williamsburg City 
VA Norfolk-Virginia Beach, Newport News Area, VA-NC (continued) 
York County   15 
King  County 
Snohomish County Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue Area 
Pierce County    81 
Clark County 
WA 
Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton Area, OR-WA 




Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis Area 
Waukesha County 18 
Pierce County 
WI 
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington Area, MN-WI 
St. Croix County 0 
Tier 2 Total  1,790 
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through the Geospatial Data Warehouse, the Healthcare Service Delivery Sites data provides a more 
accurate representation of CHC resources and access points.  For example, dental programs, migrant 
health programs (seasonal and permanent), and other service sites (e.g. nursing homes, correctional 
facilities) that contract CHCs for primary care services are important to biosurveillance but are not 
generally listed in the Federally Qualified Health Center data (see also “Dentistry’s Role in Responding to 
Bioterrorism and Other Catastrophic Events” at: 
http://www.ada.org/prof/resources/topics/topics_bioterrorism_conf.pdf.    
Likewise, mobile medical units and dental clinics, could be similarly valuable response assets, but 
similarly are not generally noted.  On the other hand, CHCs may maintain hospital privileges, notably 
among those providing OB-GYN services, and include these establishments as service delivery sites which 
ultimately skew the counts. Additionally, FQHC Look-A-Likes are subject to the same BPHC expectations, 
PIN 2007-15 included, as FQHCs but do not receive Section 330 funding and are thus exempt from 
grantee reporting requirements and are not documented in the Healthcare Service Delivery Sites. NACHC 
suggests that FQHC Look-A-Likes could increase CHC counts by approximately 10 percent. Each state’s 
PCA may be a good source for the most accurate profile of CHCs in UASI jurisdictions and the most 
appropriate site for administrative contact information.  
